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There may be a way to maintain a monistic wavefunction ontology, but 
it is certainly not trivial to see what that way is. 
[28, p. 129, original emphasis] 
 
Abstract: Everett suggested that there’s no such thing as wavefunction collapse. He 
hypothesized that for an idealized spin measurement the apparatus evolves into a 
superposition on the pointer basis of two apparatuses, each displaying one of the two 
outcomes which are standardly thought of as alternatives. And as a result the observer 
‘splits’ into two observers, each perceiving a different outcome. 
There have been problems. Why the pointer basis? Decoherence is generally 
accepted by Everettian theorists to be the key to the right answer there. And in what sense 
is probability involved, when all possible outcomes occur? Everett’s response to that 
problem was inadequate. A first attempt to find a different route to probability was 
introduce by Neil Graham in 1973 and the path from there has led to two distinct models 
of branching. I describe how the ideas have evolved and their relation to the concepts of 
uncertainty and objective probability. Then I describe the further problem of 
wavefunction monism, emphasized by Maudlin, and make a suggestion as to how it 
might be resolved. 
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1. Two Concepts of Branching 
 
There are two ways to model branching, both of which can be illustrated by the waters of 
a river being distributed into the streams of an estuary. If water is thought of as a 
continuous substance, as many physicists still believed not much more than a century 
ago, the river splits into lesser streams. But if water is composed of classical particles, 
each particle follows a linear trajectory taking it on a unique path to the sea; no particle 
splits. It was clearly the former analogy which Hugh Everett III had in mind when he 
proposed what he called the relative state formulation of quantum mechanics. He wrote 
of observers splitting in quantum measurement contexts [1]. 
An observer about to make an idealized z-spin measurement on an x-spin-up 
particle is to be thought of as splitting into an observer perceiving the outcome U (z-spin-
up) and an observer perceiving the outcome D (z-spin-down). On a stochastic 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, where exclusively one or the other outcome is 
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thought to occur, the pre-measurement observer assigns probabilities for the later 
occurrence of U and D according the Born rule, where the probability of U plus the 
probability of D is equal to 1 for the idealized case. But how can an observer who expects 
to split assign probabilities to future observations? Jeffrey Barrett argues that it was 
dissatisfaction with Everett’s attempted response to this problem which led Neill Graham 
to propose an alternative structure to the branching process [2]. 
I shall use the analogy of a bifurcating road to make the change of perspective 
vivid. For the idealized measurement there are just two branches, one for the outcome U 
and the other for the outcome D. Each branch has a quantum amplitude whose absolute 
square is commonly called the branch weight (W) where WU + WD = 1. For the road 
analogy W can be imagined as corresponding to width. Everett thought in terms of a road 
of unit width bifurcating into two roads of lesser widths which sum to unity. The observer 
can be thought of as travelling along the unit road and splitting in an amoeba-like way at 
the junction into an observer on the U road and an observer on the D road. Everett 
himself used the analogy of an amoeba in an unpublished manuscript [4]. As Barrett 
explains, Everett thought of an observer conducting a series of such measurements as 
repeatedly splitting and attempted to analyze the statistical recordings for the resulting set 
of observers in terms of a notion of typicality which would do the work of a standard 
probabilistic assessment of statistical evidence. 
Graham sought to bring a probability more directly into the picture by modifying 
the concept of branching. Instead of our road bifurcating into two roads it bifurcates into 
two sets of roads in such a way that the measure of the U set of roads is WU and the 
measure of D set is WD. We can now imagine that on making the measurement the 
observer splits into some number N(WU) of observers observing U and N(WD) of 
observers observing D [3]. The idea is blatantly ad hoc but that’s not the only problem. 
As Barrett points out, there’s an implicit assumption of a principle of indifference: 
the idea that the original observer is equally likely to find theirself on any one of the 
plethora of post-measurement branches [2]. It’s also puzzling why the pre-measurement 
observer should somehow expect to find themself on any one of the post-measurement 
branches. In what sense can any one of the downstream observers be identified with the 
upstream observer? An attempt to meet the latter problem was made by David Deutsch 
when he wrote: 
 
I propose a slight change in the Everett interpretation: 
Axiom 8. The world consists of a continuously infinite-measured set of 
universes. By a ‘measured set’ I mean a set together with a measure on 
that set. [5] 
 
He continued as follows (by substituting {2} for Deutsch’s term I have adapted the 
citation to make ‘model measurement’ refer to our idealized spin measurement): 
 
Each of these subsets [of the original set of universes], which 
I shall call a branch, consists of a continuous infinity of 
identical universes. During the model measurement, the 
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world has initially only one branch and is partitioned into {2} 
branches. The branches play the same role as individual 
universes do in Everett’s original version, but the 
probabilistic interpretation is now truly ‘built in’. [5]  
 
To continue with the road analogy, we now have a continuous infinity of roads running 
parallel, on each of which are isomorphic observers about to make ‘identical’ 
measurements. Like the particles of water which never split, no road bifurcates but when 
the parallel measurements occur each road does a dogleg turn so that the original set of 
roads partitions into a subset which constitutes the U  branch, measure WU, and a subset 
which constitutes the D branch, measure WD. 
In each of Deutsch’s identical universes the result of the target measurement is 
destined to be either U or D but an observer is in principle unable to determine in advance 
whether s/he inhabits a universe where the result will be U or a universe where the result 
will be D. Although he doesn’t explicitly say so, Deutsch thus appeals to a notion of self-
location ignorance to introduce pre-measurement uncertainty. Prior to the measurement 
an observer doesn’t know which sort of identical universe s/he inhabits, one in which U 
will occur or one in which D will occur. That’s why Deutsch sees his proposal as making 
a probabilistic interpretation of the branching process ‘built in’.1 
Hilary Greaves interpreted Deutsch’s proposal in this way, writing: 
 
David Deutsch suggests that, to solve the incoherence problem, the 
ontology of the many-worlds interpretation needs to be supplemented. 
In addition to the quantum state of the universe, we are to postulate a 
continuously infinite set of universes, together with a preferred measure 
on that set. The measure is such that, when a measurement occurs, the 
proportion of universes in the original branch that end up on a given 
branch is given by the mod-squared measure of that branch. Observers 
can then be uncertain about which outcome will occur in the universe 
they are in. 
[6,	  §1.2, original emphasis] 
 
Strictly speaking the term ‘proportion’ doesn’t apply to Deutsch’s infinite set of identical 
universe but Greaves here recognizes that Deutsch has attempted to resolve what she 
called the incoherence problem for Everettian theory, though she didn’t embrace the 
proposal. What Greaves refers to as the incoherence problem is, as she put it: 
 
How can it make sense to talk of probabilities (other than 0 and 1) at all, 
since all 'possible' outcomes actually occur? [6, §1.1] 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Deutsch has confirmed that he was indeed thinking in terms of self-location uncertainty 
at the time. Private communication. 
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Prior to measurement, Deutsch’s observer is ignorant as to which sort of identical 
universe s/he inhabits but, on the basis of knowing the upcoming branch weights, assigns 
a subjective probability equal to WU to being in a universe where the measurement 
outcome will be U and a subjective probability equal to WD to being in a universe where 
the measurement outcome will be D. Axiom 8 can be seen as a modification of Graham’s 
proposal in order to introduce pre-measurement uncertainty via self-location ignorance 
and assumes that measures on an infinite set can be taken as a guide to subjective 
probability assignments. As with Graham’s proposal, choice of measure, which Greaves 
refers to above as ‘a preferred measure’ is ad hoc, simply chosen to make probability 
assignments conform to the Born rule and there is also an implicit appeal to a principle of 
indifference. 
Responding to this problem about the choice of a preferred measure led Deutsch to 
be the first to introduce decision theory to deriving the Born rule for an interpretation of 
quantum mechanics which takes processes such as our idealized measurement as 
involving branching rather than stochasticity [7] 2 . David Wallace has since done 
considerable further work on Deutsch’s original idea so that the line of reasoning has 
come to be known as the Deutsch-Wallace argument [8, pp. 160-189]. Tim Maudlin 
forcefully rejects it and there have been several other challenges [9]. 
The Deutsch-Wallace argument claims to show that a well informed observer pre-
measurement should assign subjective probabilities equal to what they take the post-
measurement branch weights to be. And note that this effectively makes Deutsch’s 
Axiom 8 redundant. If the argument is good it applies just as well to Everett’s original 
conception of branching as like the bifurcation of a road. It might be objected that for that 
original conception, where the observer must expect to split, there is no available concept 
of pre-measurement uncertainty but it’s controversial whether such uncertainty is 
required for the Deutsch-Wallace argument to go through. Greaves has argued against 
any need for uncertainty in Everettian theory [10].  
 
2 Vaidmanian uncertainty 
 
Even if there’s some controversy as whether a notion of uncertainty needs to be 
associated with the concept of probability nobody would deny that intuitively things look 
more difficult for Everettian theory if any appeal to uncertainty is absent. And we have 
seen that a quest for a role for uncertainty seems to have motivated the first departures 
from Everett’s idea that for our idealized measurement observers split in two. The 
departure from Everett’s original amoebal concept of branching is nascent in Graham’s 
proposal and blatant for Deutsch’s Axiom 8. 
Lev Vaidman was the first to notice that there’s a way to associate uncertainty with 
Everett’s original concept of splitting. He suggested considering the situation of an 
observer post-measurement, pre-observation [12]. Like Deutsch, Vaidman used the 
concept of self-location uncertainty. For our idealized spin measurement setup, the well-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Deutsch has said that it was Brice DeWitt who brought his attention to the necessity of 
tackling the measure problem. Private communication. 
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informed post-measurement, pre-observation observer is interpreted by Vaidman as being 
uncertain as whether s/he’s on the U branch or the D branch. In such a situation Vaidman 
presumed that the observer should assign a subjective probability equal to WU to being on 
the U branch and WD to being on the D branch, an assumption which Paul Tappenden 
later called the Born-Vaidman rule [11, p. 104]. 
David Albert objected that Vaidmanian uncertainty ‘comes too late, if it comes at 
all’ [13]. Here, it’s worth considering what role post-measurement, pre-observation 
uncertainty plays in stochastic theory. From that point of view, our idealized spin 
measurement would normally be performed by an observer who perceives the outcome as 
soon as it occurs. And since the notion of pre-measurement uncertainty seems 
unproblematic for stochastic theory there’s no motivation to consider what the subjective 
probability assignments of a post-measurement observer would be if s/he were ignorant of 
the outcome. If the pre-measurement observer were offered a wager on outcomes it would 
seem unproblematic that s/he should make judgments as to how to bet on the basis of pre-
measurement uncertainty. 
But clearly in the stochastic case it’s possible for an observer to be ignorant of the 
outcome post-measurement and, equally clearly, in such a situation the observer would 
make exactly the same judgments as to how to bet post-measurement as they would have 
done pre-measurement. So if the post-measurement, pre-observation observer were 
offered the same wager but told that stakes had to be laid before measurement they would 
clearly regret not having laid a stake beforehand if they had not done so. Knowing that in 
advance, the pre-measurement observer would have reason to lay a stake pre-
measurement. The implication is that in the stochastic case minimizing possible future 
regret is just as good a reason to act as is maximizing possible future gain. The same 
argument applies in the Vaidmanian case, as was pointed out by Tappenden [11, p. 116]. 
Albert’s objection is thus fully met. The mere possibility of post-measurement, pre-
observation uncertainty is enough to give good reason to act pre-measurement. That 
hasn’t been noticed for stochastic theory but is true there too. 
Prior to Tappenden’s argument, Vaidman suggested a different way to explain pre-
measurement betting in splitting scenarios. He argued that the pre-measurement observer 
should ‘care’ about the weights of post-measurement branches in a way which would 
explain rational betting behavior [14]. Greaves later developed the idea at some length 
independently [10, §2.3]. Tappenden’s argument effectively demonstrates that what the 
pre-measurement observer should care about is the gambling judgment of a possible post-
measurement, pre-observation observer. 
A further problem has remained for the traditional Everettian concept of branching 
as splitting. For our idealized spin measurement the Vaidmanian observer clearly must 
assign subjective probabilities to going on to observe U and D equal to WU and WD  just 
as an observer applying stochastic theory must assign subjective probabilities equal to the 
objective probabilities for the outcomes U and D. Yet on the splitting model, unmodified 
either à la Graham or à la Deutsch, there are just two post-measurement, pre-observation 
observers according to Vaidman, one on the U branch and one on the D branch. In which 
case each would seem to have to think that they are either the observer on the U branch or 
the observer on the D branch and can’t tell which so either is just as likely as the other. So 
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each post-measurement, pre-observation observer should assign subjective probabilities 
of 0.5 to each possibility, irrespective of the values of WU and WD. In other words, the 
probability judgments of the Vaidmanian observer should be ruled by a principle of 
indifference, which makes no sense at all for Everettian theory. There are currently two 
arguments that the principle of indifference should be overruled by the post-
measurement, pre-observation observer which I shall not attempt to assess here [15] [16]. 
They are currently the last word for the Vaidmanian approach to Everettian splitting. 
Let’s now go on to the last word for the alternative model of branching introduced by 
Deutsch. 
 
3 Parallel universes again 
 	  
Deutsch has not given up on his interpretation of branching as the partitioning of a set of 
identical universes but has recognized that if multiple universes prior to partitioning are 
thought of as being qualitatively identical the question naturally arises as to why 
partitioning should arise at all. What could bring about differences between qualitatively 
identical universes other than stochastic processes taking place within each of them? 
Invoking stochastic processes here would make the whole scheme pointless since that 
was exactly what Everett was trying to do without. Deutsch has attempted to address this 
problem by using the concept of fungibility. He writes: 
 
It is consistent for two identical entities to become different 
under deterministic and symmetrical laws. But, for that to 
happen, they must be more than just exact images of each 
other: they must be fungible 
[17, p. 265, original emphasis] 
 
He continues: 
It is not that they [identical universes] coincide in anything, 
such as an external space: they are not in space. An instance 
of space is part of each of them. That they ‘coincide’ means 
only that they are not separate in any way. 
It is hard to imagine perfectly identical things 
coinciding. For instance, as soon as you imagine just one of 
them, your imagination has already violated their 
fungibility. But, although imagination may baulk, reason 
does not. 
[17, p. 269, original emphasis] 
 
The suggestion is that thinking of identical universes as like proverbial peas in a pod is 
too simplistic and they should rather be thought of as like euros. There is no sense in 
asking the bank to return the very same euros which one deposited. The coins are not 
fungible but the euros are. However, this suggestion seems to create a problem because 
an observer can presumably indexically refer to the spin measurement device s/he is 
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about to activate. The idea is supposed to be that the observer is ignorant as to which one 
of an infinite set of devices it is. It is either a device which is destined to show U or a 
device which is destined to show D. But it’s impossible to indexically refer to a particular 
one of a set of objects which are fungible. I can point to the coin which I deposit at the 
bank but not to the euro which is thereby added to my account. So Deutsch’s introduction 
of the concept of fungibility seems to undermine the idea that one can point to a device 
which has a determinate future which it is in principle impossible to know in advance. 
That suggests that if it’s assumed that an observer can indexically refer to a spin 
measurement device, something generally taken for granted, then either the device 
operates stochastically or it splits in the way Everett suggested. If indexical reference 
isn’t available then the device cannot have a predetermined future which the observer is 
in principle unable to determine in advance, given total knowledge of the universe which 
they inhabit. The problem of indexical reference has also arisen for an alternative view of 
branching which bears some similarity to Deutsch’s idea of a partitioning set of parallel 
universes. 
 
4 Overlap 
 
Independently of Deutsch, Simon Saunders and David Wallace have also sought to 
introduce pre-measurement uncertainty to Everettian theory via a concept of self-location 
ignorance [18]. Their proposal is based on David Lewis’s analysis of personal fission 
scenarios introduced to philosophical discussion of personal identity, independent of 
concerns about physics [19]. In describing Lewis’s work Saunders and Wallace write: 
 
The trick was to suppose in the face of branching, say into two, that 
there are two persons present all along – persons who initially 
overlap or coincide. This is equivalent to the stipulation that by 
‘person’, roughly speaking, we mean a unique cradle-to-grave 
continuant, specifically a unique spacetime worm. As for the 
meaning of ‘overlapping’, there are plenty of homely analogies: the 
Chester A. Arthur Parkway, [Lewis] observed, overlaps with Route 
137 for a brief stretch, but still there are two roads. 
[18, pp. 294-5, original emphasis] 
 
Two different roads can have a strip of tarmac in common. Likewise, two distinct persons 
can have ‘temporal parts’ of their bodies in common. Transposed to the context of the 
idealized spin measurement, there are two observers present all along, observerU who 
observes the outcome U and observerD who observes the outcome D. Prior to the 
measurement those two observers have temporal parts of their bodies in common, like the 
two roads having a stretch of tarmac in common. Furthermore, unlike Lewis, Saunders 
and Wallace suggest that, ‘it is at least somewhat natural to attribute two sets of thoughts 
to those persons’ [18, p. 303]. 
In other words, if well informed prior to measurement, both observerU and 
observerD can think: ‘I’m one of two types of person. I’m either a person who’s going to 
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observe U or I’m a person who’s going to observe D, but I’m ignorant as to which’. This 
is somewhat like Deutsch’s proposal [5], a difference being that Saunders and Wallace 
generate the idea of there being multiple observers prior to the measurement via Lewis’s 
concept of overlap rather that Deutsch’s Axiom 8 which posits non-overlapping ‘parallel’ 
universes. 
Saunders’ and Wallace’s overlap proposal was queried by Tappenden who argued 
that the putative pre-measurement observerU and observerD would not each be able to 
make indexical reference to their own bodies since before measurement their bodies have 
their temporal parts in common, like the overlapping roads [20]. Responding to that 
criticism, Saunders and Wallace emphasized that their analysis depends on an idea from 
linguistics know as the principle of interpretive charity, opening their reply to Tappenden 
with a quote from the philosopher of language Donald Davidson [21]. 
To see the linguistic principle of charity in action, imagine taking a bird’s eye view 
of the idealized spin measurement given the overlap interpretation of the setup. What is 
seen prior to the measurement can seem to be a single observer making a single utterance 
of ‘I’m one of two types of person. I’m either a person who’s going to observe U or I’m a 
person who’s going to observe D, but I’m ignorant as to which’. If what is heard is 
interpreted as the single utterance of one person then it’s false, because there is one 
person who is going to split, not two persons one of whom is going to observe U and the 
other D. 
But a more ‘charitable’ interpretation of what’s heard is apparently possible; 
charitable because it takes what’s heard to be true. What’s heard can be taken to be two 
distinct utterances by two distinct observers even though only a single sound is heard. 
Rather as if the word ‘here’ written on a strip of tarmac common to those two overlapping 
roads were taken to refer to a position on the Chester A. Arthur Parkway and also, 
separately, to a position on Route 137. According to Saunders and Wallace, interpreting 
‘I’m one of two types of person. I’m either a person who’s going to observe U or I’m a 
person who’s going to observe D, but I’m ignorant as to which’ as true is important and 
an apparently metaphysical concern about indexical reference can be set aside for the 
sake of preserving a concept of pre-measurement uncertainty in the face of branching. As 
Saunders and Wallace put it: 
 
Tappenden, by contrast, does seem to be looking for deep 
metaphysical truths: truths to which we have no access except via 
our pre-scientific intuitions, yet which we can know so surely that 
they bear on our choice of scientific theory. 
(ibid.: 317) 
 
Saunders’ and Wallace’s ‘choice of scientific theory’ here refers to their choice of the 
overlap interpretation of branching, where there are two observers present prior to the 
idealized spin measurement, rather than the splitting interpretation where there is just one 
observer who splits. But in what sense are those different interpretations ‘scientific’ 
rather than metaphysical? It would seem that no possible experiment could decide 
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between them, given Everett’s hypothesis that processes which have been thought of as 
stochastic in fact involve branching. 
 
5 Divergence 
 
Following the overlap proposal, Saunders has made an alternative suggestion a bit closer 
to Deutsch’s original idea. He does not suggest that quantum mechanics requires a 
supplementary axiom, as Deutsch did, but rather that the formalism allows branching to 
be interpreted as the partitioning of a set ‘worlds’ which are qualitatively identical prior 
to branching (like Deutsch’s ‘identical universes’) but which do not overlap in the sense 
of having temporal parts in common [22, pp. 196-200]. He refers to this view of the 
partitioning of a set of worlds as ‘divergence’ and writes: 
 
once stated in this way, the suspicion is that whether worlds in 
EQM [Everettian Quantum Mechanics] diverge or overlap is 
underdetermined by the mathematics. One can use either picture; 
they are better or worse adapted to different purposes. 
[22, p. 200] 
 
Earlier, he writes: 
 
The worry is not that overlapping worlds are unintelligible or 
inconsistent; it is that they make nonsense of ordinary beliefs […] 
Diverging worlds, composed of objects and events that do not 
overlap (that are qualitatively but not numerically identical) do not 
suffer from this problem. 
[22, p. 197] 
 
That makes Saunders’ preference clear for a divergence model of branching, rather than 
an overlap model. Alastair Wilson has articulated Saunders’ concept of a divergence 
model of branching in a different way, writing: 
 
The diverging picture arises from a non-standard interpretation of 
the consistent histories formalism. The projection operators which 
feature in the consistent histories formalism are normally 
interpreted as representing token property-instantiations. This 
allows that objects or events in two different histories can be 
numerically identical, resulting in a metaphysic of overlapping 
Everett worlds. But if the projection operators are instead 
interpreted as representing types of property-instantiations, then it 
becomes possible for events in distinct histories to only ever be 
qualitatively identical to one another, generating a metaphysic of 
diverging Everett worlds. 
[23, pp. 714-715] 
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Wilson has developed Saunders’ divergence concept of Everettian branching into a 
version of what Lewis has called ‘modal realism’ which takes talk of possible worlds to 
refer to concretely existing worlds. As Lewis puts it: 
 
There are so many other worlds, in fact, that absolutely every way 
that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is. 
[24, p. 2, original emphases] 
 
Wilson restricts Lewis’s notion of possibility to what is physically possible according to 
quantum mechanics. The divergence interpretation of branching then naturally translates 
into a modal realism where an observer inhabits an actual world which is just one of 
many, concretely existing, physically possible worlds. To see how that works, consider 
Saunders’ divergence analysis of the idealized spin measurement. 
Prior to the measurement there are many observers in worlds which do not overlap. 
Those worlds have had qualitatively identical histories up until the measurement event, 
which involves corresponding measurement devices in each world. Each device, it is 
claimed, does not operate stochastically, rather it is determined in advance whether it will 
record U or D but it is in principle impossible for the observer in each world to predict 
what the outcome in that world will be. Each observer pre-measurement is thus subject to 
self-location uncertainty. Each well informed observer knows that s/he inhabits a world 
where the result will be exclusively either U or D but does not know which is the case. 
Wilson, very plausibly, translates the statement by a pre-measurement observer of: 
‘I’m in a world where the measurement outcome is destined to be U or D but I don’t 
know which’ as ‘Possibly I’m in a world where the outcome is destined to be U and 
possibly I’m in a world where the outcome is destined to be D but I don’t know what is 
actually the case’. Thus an observer pre-measurement, according to Wilson, should think 
of themself as actually inhabiting one of a set of extant, currently qualitatively identical, 
‘possible’ worlds. Wilson’s thoughts on this are fully developed in [25]. 
Recall that I mentioned that Deutsch has addressed the question as to why a set of 
qualitatively identical worlds should diverge. If those worlds do not contain stochastic 
processes what reason could there be for them to diverge? And I indicated possible 
reasons for concern about the ability of an observer to make indexical reference to objects 
in their environment, including their own body, both on Deutsch’s conception of identical 
universes which are ‘fungible’ and in the case of overlapping worlds. There must at least 
be some suspicion that a similar thought applies to the Saunders-Wilson concept of 
divergence. I quoted Wilson above suggesting that the divergence interpretation of 
branching arises out of understanding quantum-mechanical representations as referring to 
types of property instantiations rather than token property instantiations. That would seem 
to make Saunders-Wilson parallel worlds fungible in the sense which Deutsch has 
attributed to his identical universes. Can an observer in one of a number of fungible 
worlds indexically refer to objects in their environment? It seems that that question needs 
to be addressed for any scheme which interprets branching as the partitioning of linear 
histories. 
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6 The world as wavefunction 
 
There is as yet no consensus amongst philosophers of physics that Everettian probability 
problem has been resolved, far from it. But, as we’ve seen, Everettian theorists have 
mounted some ingenious challenges to the idea that the problem is intractable. At the 
same time, amongst Everettian theorists there’s no consensus as to how uncertainty fits 
into the picture. Struggling with that problem has spawned distinct and incompatible 
models for the metaphysics of branching and discussion is ongoing. 
I now want to take a look at another problem for Everettian theory which has been 
waiting in the wings. The question of wavefunction monism; the idea that all of material 
existence just is the universal quantum wavefunction. In recent years there has been much 
discussion about the existential status of the wavefunction. What I want to do here is 
propose a metaphysics which may be appropriate for wavefunction monism in an 
Everettian context. We have seen how fundamental the role of metaphysics has been in 
the development of ideas about branching and uncertainty. Perhaps metaphysics has a 
fundamental role to play as well in the debate about the existential status of the 
wavefunction in Everettian theory. By way of pursuing that thought, I want to discuss an 
idea which Wallace refers to as the Hydra View [8, p. 281]. And that coupled with an idea 
introduced by Tappenden in [26] and further developed in [27]. 
The Hydra view is that a physicist, and the measuring device to which s/he can 
indexically refer, split in idealized spin measurement contexts. The pointer evolves, via 
decoherence, into a superposition of showing U and D. The two elements of the 
superposed pointer are both pointers which have the same mass and volume as the 
superposed pointer itself. Each element of the superposed pointer is to be considered as a 
novel type of part; neither a spatial part nor a temporal part but a superpositional part.  
If the world is wavefunction it’s the stuff of cats, dead or alive. But how can a cat 
be indefinitely dead or alive? The Hydra view of what happens to Schrödinger’s cat when 
you close its idealized, causally isolated box is that it quickly evolves into a superposition 
of two cats, one alive and the other dead, each of which is a superpositional part of the 
superposed cat. Given the setup in Schrödinger’s box, the quantum amplitude of the dead 
cat increases with time whilst that of the live cat decreases. The masses of each of the two 
cats remains the same, for all practical purposes, so the superposed cat always definitely 
has the mass of one cat, since both its superpositional parts have the same mass. 
Schrödinger’s cat is in an indefinite dead/alive state because the two cats which are its 
superpositional parts are neither both dead nor both alive. 
I now propose to combine this analysis of the Schrödinger cat scenario with the 
concrete sets hypothesis introduced in [26, pp. 9-10]. The aim there was to make 
intelligible the idea that branch weight can be identified with objective probability, which 
seems counterintuitive because, on the face of it, if quantum processes are deterministic 
then that must necessarily exclude the possibility that objective probability is involved. 
Tappenden has described a thought experiment designed to show that determinism and 
objective probability are indeed compatible. Briefly, the idea is to imagine a large but not 
infinite set of isomorphic ‘parallel universes’ in which quantum processes are stochastic 
and isomorphic observers in each universe are about to undertake our model spin 
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measurement. Each observer believes that the process about to take place is stochastic 
and, being well informed, s/he is able to assign what s/he believes to be objective 
probabilities to the possible outcomes. Given the law of large numbers, what happens 
when the parallel measurements take place is that the set of universes partitions into two 
subsets where different outcomes occur, the measures of the subsets equaling the 
objective probabilities attributed to the possible outcomes of the parallel stochastic 
measurement processes. 
Tappenden then argues that an alternative interpretation of the mentality of 
observers is possible. Instead of it being supposed that there are individual observers in 
each universe it is possible to interpret the situation as involving a single observer whose 
mind spans all the universes. The body of the single observer is the set of isomorphic 
doppelgangers, one in each universe. And what that single observer indexically refers to 
as the measuring device is the set of isomorphic measuring devices. That single observer 
is in the very same mental state as the original multiple observers. The mental state is 
individuated by its mental content, which involves the beliefs that the measurement 
process about to be observed is stochastic and that objective probabilities can be assigned 
to what are possible outcomes. The change of interpretation does not involve a change in 
observers’ mental content, it just involves supposing that there’s a single token of the 
mental content rather than multiple tokens, one in each universe. 
On this alternative interpretation of the setup what happens to the single observer is 
that s/he splits into two observers each observing a different outcome because the original 
set of doppelgangers partitions into two subsets, each exposed to a different result 
because the measuring device has partitioned into two subsets. If the proposed alternative 
interpretation of mentality is coherent, what the though experiment demonstrates is that 
it’s possible that an observer who thinks that a process is stochastic is mistaken. It’s 
intelligible that what the observer believes to be a measuring device which will show 
exclusively one or another of two outcomes is in fact a measuring device which will split 
into two devices each showing a different outcome. And it’s possible that what the 
observer takes to be objective probabilities do not attach to possibilities but rather to the 
subset measures which correspond to Everettian branch weights in the imaginary setup. 
The alternative interpretation of the mind-body relation in the thought experiment 
involves the idea that a set of isomorphic doppelgangers instances a single observer and 
that objects in that observers environment are sets. The interpretation requires the 
concrete sets hypothesis and that entails that if there exist two ordinary, everyday cats, 
each with a mass of 5kg., one dead and the other alive, then the set of those two cats is 
also a cat. The set has a definite mass equal to the mass which the dead and live cats have 
in common, 5kg. And the cat which is the set is neither dead nor alive because the cats 
which are its elements are neither both dead nor both alive. 
The concrete sets hypothesis is required for the alternative interpretation of the 
mind-body relation and so appears to be necessary to making intelligible the idea that 
what has been thought to be a stochastic process having possible outcomes with objective 
probabilities is in fact a branching process where co-existing branches have associated 
objective probabilities. So it’s plausible that the concrete sets hypothesis may have a 
fundamental role to play in making Everettian theory intelligible. And the concrete sets 
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hypothesis entails that any set of concrete objects is itself a concrete object with 
properties which may, or may not, be definite. Schrödinger’s cat, on the Hydra view, is a 
superposition which has a live and a dead cat as elements (superpositional parts). What 
the above argument suggests is that the elements of a superposition are elements in the 
set-theoretic sense. In other words superpositional parts are not a novel type of part as 
suggested by the Hydra view but rather set-theoretic elements.  
Schrödinger’s cat, on the Hydra view, is the product of decoherence. When the box 
is closed the radioactive sample in the poison-triggering mechanism is in a superposition 
which decoheres into decayed and non-decayed samples, triggering the evolution of the 
cat into a decohered superposition of dead and live cats. But there’s no reason to suppose 
that the physical evolution of a superposition should change its metaphysical constitution. 
In which case what physicists call the elements of any superposition are elements in the 
set-theoretic sense. 
Let’s now apply these ideas to the problem of wavefunction monism. Tim Maudlin 
has posed the problem very clearly: 
 
In sum, any theory whose physical ontology is a complete wavefunction 
monism automatically inherits a severe interpretational problem: if all 
there is is the wavefunction, an extremely high-dimensional object 
evolving in some specified way, how does that account for the low-
dimensional world of localized objects that we start off believing in, 
whose apparent behavior constitutes the explanandum of physics in the 
first place? […] And it should be obvious that all the resources of the 
phrase ‘configuration space’ are legitimately available to a non-monist 
who postulates a plethora of localized particles (or strings, or whatever) 
in a common low-dimensional space. 
[27, pp. 132-33, original emphasis] 
 
Consider the bound electron in a hydrogen atom in the light of the concrete sets 
hypothesis and the idea that the elements of a superposition are elements in the set-
theoretic sense. At any give moment the electron is a ‘point particle’ with indefinite 
position, which is to say that it has elements at different positions in the ‘electron-cloud’, 
each element being an electron. The ‘electron-cloud’ surrounding the nucleus is an 
electron which is a set of electrons. 
Imagine a field full of cats, each with a mass of 5kg. and each necessarily at a 
different position. The cat which is the set of those cats, according to the concrete sets 
hypothesis, has a definite mass of 5kg. but indefinite position. The electron which is the 
set of electrons in the electron-cloud is like the set of cats in the field. A natural minimal 
position for a point particle would be a Planck volume so for each Planck volume in the 
electron-cloud there is an electron which has a share of position amplitude and phase and, 
again, the single bound electron in the hydrogen atom, at any given moment, is the set of 
all those electrons. And each of those electrons will be a set of electrons with different 
momenta. To be sure, the picture becomes more complex if we consider the quantum 
wavefuncion of two or more entangled point particles. Now there will be two or more 
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elements of each particle present for each Planck volume and the relation between them 
will embody the entanglement of the particles at that position. For an environment such 
as ours, where immense numbers of particles are entangled, the picture becomes 
extremely complex but now we have Maudlin’s ‘plethora of localized particles’ with 
which to construct a metaphysics for wavefunction monism. It may seem an extravagant 
speculation, but perhaps I’ve succeeded showing that it’s not unreasonable. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
Everettian theory refuses to lie down and die, despite many attempts to kill it off. And yet 
there’s no consensus amongst Everettian theorists as to how probability is to be 
understood in branching contexts nor how the metaphysics of branching itself is to be 
interpreted. There’s also disagreement about what role wavefunction realism might, or 
might not, have to play in Everettian theory. I hope to have clarified some of the issues 
involved and to have made an intelligible suggestion as to how wavefunction monism 
may be compatible with Everettian theory. 
In his Nobel address Max Born said: 
 
How does it come about then, that great scientists such as Einstein, 
Schrödinger and De Broglie are nevertheless dissatisfied with the 
situation? […] The lesson to be learned from what I have told of 
the origin of quantum mechanics is that probable refinements of 
mathematical methods will not suffice to produce a satisfactory 
theory, but that somewhere in our doctrine is hidden a concept, 
unjustified by experience, which we must eliminate to open up the 
road. [28] 
 
Everett wrote: 
 
Arguments that the world picture presented by this theory is 
contradicted by experience because we are unaware of any 
branching process are like the criticism of the Copernican theory 
that the mobility of the earth as a real physical fact is incompatible 
with the common sense interpretation of nature because we feel no 
such motion. [1] 
 
That anticipates Gertrude Anscombe’s recollection of an exchange with Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: 
 
He once greeted me with the question: ‘Why do people say that it 
was natural to think that the sun went round the earth rather than 
that the earth turned on its axis?’. I replied, ‘I suppose, because it 
looked as if the sun went round the earth’. ‘Well,’ he asked, ‘what 
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would it have looked like if it had looked as if the earth turned on 
its axis’? [29]3 
 
Transposed to the Everettian context the exchange might go like this. ‘Why did physicists 
think it natural to believe that the measurement of a superposition on the pointer basis 
yields a single result rather than multiple results’? Reply: ‘I suppose because it looked as 
if a single result is yielded’. Response: ‘Well, what would it have looked like if it had 
looked as if multiple results are yielded?’. 
Is Born’s ‘hidden concept, unjustified by experience’ simply the idea that physicists 
don’t split when they observe quantum superpositions? 
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